A book by Richard C. Koo immodestly entitled 'The Holy Grail of Macroeconomics: lessons from Japan's Great Recession' is a good example of how mainstream economists are rediscovering what those outside the mainstream having been saying for years.
In this case the obvious is that when the private sector (households and businesses) are heavily in debt and their income drops they try to repay their debt rather than borrow more. The main contribution from this book is to provide empirical evidence for this by looking at actual behaviour during the Great Depression in the USA and the Great Recession in Japan. He shows that during these periods companies and household were reluctant to borrow and instead tried to reduce their debt or 'repair their balance sheet'. When the aggregate private sector does this demand remains depressed, resulting in what he call a 'balance sheet recessions'. He points out that this contradicts mainstream economic thinking, which is revealing about how wrong this thinking is.
The current stagnation across the developed world is exactly this kind of balance sheet recession. Aggregate private sector debt reached record levels just before the onset of the crisis and remains very high.
The practical importance of this is that during balance sheet recessions policies that try to stimulate growth by encouraging more borrowing are doomed to fail. Yet these are the main policies that have been promoted by mainstream economists today. They are not working and so central banks are coming up with ever more desperate measures to stimulate borrowing, such as quantitative easing. Banks are being accused of failing to lend when the real problem is the absence of any desire to borrow. Why should businesses take out loans to expand their businesses when demand is stagnant and there is excess capacity?
The experience in Japan, where 15 years of unprecedented loose monetary policy has failed to stimulate growth, is compelling evidence that this policy won't work. Japan has only managed to grow by remaining a net exporter.
So what is his solution? His big idea is that during balance sheet recessions fiscal stimulus is needed. He calls it the Holy Grail of Macroeconomics because it reconciles monetarism and Keynesianism, which have long been at odds.
Surely this is just common sense? As Wynne Godley and, more recently, proponents of Modern Monetary Theory have been saying for many years, the simple accounting dictates that the aggregate private sector can accumulate net financial assets and thus 'repair its balance sheet' only if the the government sector spends more into the economy than it removes through taxes. The government is the only possible source of net financial assets for the private sector. This is no theory. It is simple reality. Or should be to anyone who understands the monetary system and the constraints of sectoral balances as shown by Godley.
However mainstream economist do not understand sectoral balances. Instead of recognising that it is an absolute NECESSITY for government to run deficits in order to enable the private sector to save they argue that the government should borrow the private sectors savings and spend them. This sound like something that is optional and therefore open to challenge. It also sounds like a call to get the government to expand relative to the private sector. Since many people are, with good reason, skeptical about governments expanding, this line of argument is unconvincing.
The way to explain the need for deficit spending is that government should not remove all the money that they spend into the economy through taxes. Instead they should reduce taxes, thereby enabling the private sector to deleverage quickly while maintaining demand. It is not about expanding the government. Instead it should be about enabling saving, reducing private sector debt, and repairing balance sheets.
Conversely cutting the deficit by decreasing spending and increasing taxes PREVENTS the private sector from saving. Since they have no choice but to try to save they simply cut spending further, resulting in a deeper recession. This is why austerity has been such a dismal failure wherever it has been tried. When you understand the problem it is fairly obvious that it is almost exactly the wrong thing to do.
Those who worry that excessive government borrowing could lead to default should be reassured that in countries with their own currencies government can never default as they create the currency. There may be a risk of inflation, but there is no risk of default.
Sunday 16 December 2012
Saturday 15 December 2012
Worrying about the wrong debt
Those who worry about debt and think it is a major problem are correct. Unfortunately they often confuse two types of debt, namely, private sector debt and government debt. These debts are entirely different. They are best considered as opposites. Government debt is, in fact, private sector savings, and vica versa. Indeed the only way that that the private sector as a whole can accumulate net financial assets is by the government sector spending more into the economy than they remove through taxation, i.e. by running a deficit.
Sound confusing? Think of it this way. The government has a legal monopoly on creating debt-free money. It creates this money by spending. If the private sector AS A WHOLE is trying to accumulate money (i.e. save) this can only come from the government spending. When government's tax they are removing money from the private sector. The annual difference between taxation and spending (the deficit) represents the amount of money created each year by the government. To repeat, government debt represents the total amount of debt-free money that the government has created. It is also exactly equal to the net financial wealth of the private sector.
The big macroeconomic change over the past 40 years has been the rise in private sector debt relative to income. This has risen to over 300% of GDP in many countries. This change was simply ignored by mainstream economists and policymakers. The usual justification was that private sector debt was matched my private sector credit so net private sector debt was zero. This is odd since it is obvious that there is a limit to how much debt can be carried by anyone which is set by their income. As debt rises relative to income an ever greater proportion of income has to be spent on servicing the debt.
The financial collapse was a result of defaulting on this debt, which created panic in the financial sector, which froze up the payment system. This induced a deep global recession which prompted the aggregate private sector cutting its spending and increasing its saving. This is entirely appropriate but it has depressed growth, since growth requires spending, and when spending is diverted to savings, growth is depressed. Governments stepped in to prevent collapse. This resulted in a big increase in deficits and government debt, which had been at record low levels in most countries before the financial crisis.
Remember that the aggregate private sector can only save if the government sector runs a deficit. Government deficits will continue to remain high precisely because the private sector is desperately trying to save by reducing its spending, which depresses growth and thus government tax revenue.
When understood this way it should be clear that attempts by the government to cut the deficit prevents the private sector from saving at their desired level. Does this austerity seem sensible when private sector debt is still at record high levels? Of course not. In fact it is counterproductive because, by depressing growth and increasing unemployment, austerity increases the private sector's desire to save. When you see your income go down and everyone else's is dropping, does it make sense to borrow more money?
Of course many will argue that, despite the damaging effect austerity has on the economy it is necessary to reduce the deficit because if we don't the government would have to pay very high interest rates to borrow money. This is an understandable mistake to make given what we have seen in the Eurozone. The difference is that Eurozone governments do not issue their own currency. They have to borrow it, and they do not control the interest rates for borrowing. This is unusual. Normally governments issue their own currency and they can set interest rates at whatever level they choose. Because of this they can never be forced to default on their own debt. That is why interest rates on government borrowing are so low in the US, the UK and Japan. There is no shortage of people keen to buy government debt even at low interest rates. Why? Because we are all still worried about the banking system, and when governments issue the currency then their debt is the safest place to store savings.
Instead of worrying about government debt policymakers should be focusing on accommodating the private sector's desire to save by increasing their deficits. Probably the best way to do this is to cut taxes, especially regressive taxes such as VAT and National Insurance. This would provide an immediate boost to demand. The deficit should be kept high until there are signs that the economy is running at full capacity. The clearest evidence of would be an increase in inflation. When this happens the deficit should be cut. If unemployment is till high then this suggests that there are structural constraints causing bottlenecks to economic growth. That is the time to focus on structural reforms to increase efficiency and eliminate bottlenecks. It should be clear from where inflation is greatest where those bottlenecks are.
Instead what the government is doing now is:
-aggressively trying to cut the deficit, when demand is already low
-trying to encourage private sector borrowing, when private sector debt is too high
-wasting time and money on structural reform without there being any evidence for structural problems.
The scale of their ignorance and incompetence is breathtaking.
Sound confusing? Think of it this way. The government has a legal monopoly on creating debt-free money. It creates this money by spending. If the private sector AS A WHOLE is trying to accumulate money (i.e. save) this can only come from the government spending. When government's tax they are removing money from the private sector. The annual difference between taxation and spending (the deficit) represents the amount of money created each year by the government. To repeat, government debt represents the total amount of debt-free money that the government has created. It is also exactly equal to the net financial wealth of the private sector.
The big macroeconomic change over the past 40 years has been the rise in private sector debt relative to income. This has risen to over 300% of GDP in many countries. This change was simply ignored by mainstream economists and policymakers. The usual justification was that private sector debt was matched my private sector credit so net private sector debt was zero. This is odd since it is obvious that there is a limit to how much debt can be carried by anyone which is set by their income. As debt rises relative to income an ever greater proportion of income has to be spent on servicing the debt.
The financial collapse was a result of defaulting on this debt, which created panic in the financial sector, which froze up the payment system. This induced a deep global recession which prompted the aggregate private sector cutting its spending and increasing its saving. This is entirely appropriate but it has depressed growth, since growth requires spending, and when spending is diverted to savings, growth is depressed. Governments stepped in to prevent collapse. This resulted in a big increase in deficits and government debt, which had been at record low levels in most countries before the financial crisis.
Remember that the aggregate private sector can only save if the government sector runs a deficit. Government deficits will continue to remain high precisely because the private sector is desperately trying to save by reducing its spending, which depresses growth and thus government tax revenue.
When understood this way it should be clear that attempts by the government to cut the deficit prevents the private sector from saving at their desired level. Does this austerity seem sensible when private sector debt is still at record high levels? Of course not. In fact it is counterproductive because, by depressing growth and increasing unemployment, austerity increases the private sector's desire to save. When you see your income go down and everyone else's is dropping, does it make sense to borrow more money?
Of course many will argue that, despite the damaging effect austerity has on the economy it is necessary to reduce the deficit because if we don't the government would have to pay very high interest rates to borrow money. This is an understandable mistake to make given what we have seen in the Eurozone. The difference is that Eurozone governments do not issue their own currency. They have to borrow it, and they do not control the interest rates for borrowing. This is unusual. Normally governments issue their own currency and they can set interest rates at whatever level they choose. Because of this they can never be forced to default on their own debt. That is why interest rates on government borrowing are so low in the US, the UK and Japan. There is no shortage of people keen to buy government debt even at low interest rates. Why? Because we are all still worried about the banking system, and when governments issue the currency then their debt is the safest place to store savings.
Instead of worrying about government debt policymakers should be focusing on accommodating the private sector's desire to save by increasing their deficits. Probably the best way to do this is to cut taxes, especially regressive taxes such as VAT and National Insurance. This would provide an immediate boost to demand. The deficit should be kept high until there are signs that the economy is running at full capacity. The clearest evidence of would be an increase in inflation. When this happens the deficit should be cut. If unemployment is till high then this suggests that there are structural constraints causing bottlenecks to economic growth. That is the time to focus on structural reforms to increase efficiency and eliminate bottlenecks. It should be clear from where inflation is greatest where those bottlenecks are.
Instead what the government is doing now is:
-aggressively trying to cut the deficit, when demand is already low
-trying to encourage private sector borrowing, when private sector debt is too high
-wasting time and money on structural reform without there being any evidence for structural problems.
The scale of their ignorance and incompetence is breathtaking.
Saturday 8 December 2012
Are we preparing the way for a new Hitler in Europe?
The strong preference of Germany for 'sound money', which was a major factor in the design of the Eurozone monetary system, may be based on a tragic misunderstanding of it's own history. Many Germans seem to believe that the hyperinflation during the Weimar Republic was somehow to blame for the shift of Germany to the right, which culminated in the disaster of the Third Reich and WWII. In fact there is no direct connection between hyperinflation and Hitler's rise to power. The sequence of causes and events was as follows.
1. The German government, saddled with huge reparation demands imposed by the rest of Europe, which it could not afford, printed money in order to devalue them (they were denominated in German currency). This succeeded but wiped out the cash savings of the German middle class. Economic growth began to recover but then slowed as governments around the world introduced 'sound money' (essentially a reintroduction of the gold standard) at the same time as balancing budgets. A new government was duly elected.
2. This government attempted to introduce sound money policies in the face of economic headwinds by cutting government expenditure and increasing interest rates. The result was a severe recession and mass unemployment. Hitler, campaigning on populist xenophobic and racist ideas that allocated the blame for this crisis on other groups (mostly Slavs and Jews) soon rose to power by popular vote.
3. Once in power he dramatically increased government spending (and the deficit) in order to rearm the country. This classical demand stimulus restored vigorous economic growth and living conditions improved rapidly. His popularity rose and his hold on power became unbreakable. The rest is well-known.
What lessons are there from this? Austerity and sound money policies do not work in a recession and when the money supply is contracting. Stubbornly pursuing them in a democracy will hand power to anyone who is prepared to abandon them. We must just hope that the politicians who eventually do what is obviously necessary to restore economic growth in Europe are not extremists. It would be tragic if the same mistake was made within living memory due to a misunderstanding of history.
1. The German government, saddled with huge reparation demands imposed by the rest of Europe, which it could not afford, printed money in order to devalue them (they were denominated in German currency). This succeeded but wiped out the cash savings of the German middle class. Economic growth began to recover but then slowed as governments around the world introduced 'sound money' (essentially a reintroduction of the gold standard) at the same time as balancing budgets. A new government was duly elected.
2. This government attempted to introduce sound money policies in the face of economic headwinds by cutting government expenditure and increasing interest rates. The result was a severe recession and mass unemployment. Hitler, campaigning on populist xenophobic and racist ideas that allocated the blame for this crisis on other groups (mostly Slavs and Jews) soon rose to power by popular vote.
3. Once in power he dramatically increased government spending (and the deficit) in order to rearm the country. This classical demand stimulus restored vigorous economic growth and living conditions improved rapidly. His popularity rose and his hold on power became unbreakable. The rest is well-known.
What lessons are there from this? Austerity and sound money policies do not work in a recession and when the money supply is contracting. Stubbornly pursuing them in a democracy will hand power to anyone who is prepared to abandon them. We must just hope that the politicians who eventually do what is obviously necessary to restore economic growth in Europe are not extremists. It would be tragic if the same mistake was made within living memory due to a misunderstanding of history.
Friday 7 December 2012
Intellectual paralysis
It was painful to watch the budget speech, but even more painful to watch Ed Ball's response to it. George Osborne had to paint a picture of a stagnating economy which will not grow significantly for the foreseeable future. This was widely predicted by those relatively few commentators who understand how our monetary system works. As they also predicted, the stagnation has been accompanied by continued deficits and ever rising debts. So what was his solution? Continue with the austerity. There is no alternative. Why? Because if the government shows any signs of reducing its commitment to fiscal 'responsibility', and cutting the deficit, the markets will punish it by refusing to lend the money the government needs to finance this deficit. The credit rating agencies will downgrade the UK's credit rating and the interest rate that the government has to pay for for its 'borrowing' will rise, increasing the 'burden' on taxpayers. the government may even find itself unable to borrow and have to go grovelling to the IMF for loans, which will impose even tougher conditions than his austerity measures.
This is, of course, complete nonsense. Government with a sovereign fiat currency and floating exchange rates have no need to 'borrow' in order to spend. They create money when they spend. Borrowing is a self-imposed requirement that simply provides the private sector with somewhere very secure to earn interest on their savings. The government and its central bank can set these interest rates at any level they want to. [This does not apply to countries that do not issue their own currency such as those in the Eurozone.]
What was most painful about watching this was that the opposition, because they have the same mistaken understanding of the monetary system as the government, were unable to offer any coherent criticism. Ed Balls was reduced to accusing the government of failing to cut the deficit, which actually supported the Chancellor's previously mistaken austerity policy and his continuation of that policy. No wonder he looked flustered and confused. His head was grappling with a contradiction so large that it induced intellectual paralysis.
The tragedy of the current economic crisis is that across the world all policymakers are operating under the same mistaken understanding of how modern monetary systems operate. Most importantly, they operate under the same view that governments must not run deficits and should try to run surpluses, believing this to be prudent. In fact this is a very dangerous. In modern fiat currency systems the governments are the only source of debt-free money. When they spend they are adding this money into the economy. When they tax they are removing it. They need to spend more than they tax (i.e. run a deficit) in order to add debt-free money into the economy. This additional money is needed to satisfy the private-sector's desire to save. Without it the economy would shrink every year by an amount exactly equal to net private sector savings, as this 'hoarding' of money removes it from circulation, reducing demand. Running a budget surplus reduces private sectors savings. Government ’debt' represents net savings of the private sector. Reducing this debt will reduce their savings. At a time when private sector debt levels are still at very high levels this seems bizarre.
There are compelling historical demonstrations of the dangers of government surpluses. For example, there is the fact that every depression in the USA in the past 230 years, and there have been six of them, was preceded by many years of government budget surpluses. Conversely, on every single occasion that the US federal government has tried to reduce its 'debt' substantially by running multi-year surpluses this has been followed by a financial collapse and a depression. When you appreciate that by running budget surpluses the government is effectively confiscating private sector savings it is not surprising that surpluses are so damaging. Logic and experience are clear. When the government is the supplier the currency deficits are necessary and surpluses are reckless.
This is, of course, complete nonsense. Government with a sovereign fiat currency and floating exchange rates have no need to 'borrow' in order to spend. They create money when they spend. Borrowing is a self-imposed requirement that simply provides the private sector with somewhere very secure to earn interest on their savings. The government and its central bank can set these interest rates at any level they want to. [This does not apply to countries that do not issue their own currency such as those in the Eurozone.]
What was most painful about watching this was that the opposition, because they have the same mistaken understanding of the monetary system as the government, were unable to offer any coherent criticism. Ed Balls was reduced to accusing the government of failing to cut the deficit, which actually supported the Chancellor's previously mistaken austerity policy and his continuation of that policy. No wonder he looked flustered and confused. His head was grappling with a contradiction so large that it induced intellectual paralysis.
The tragedy of the current economic crisis is that across the world all policymakers are operating under the same mistaken understanding of how modern monetary systems operate. Most importantly, they operate under the same view that governments must not run deficits and should try to run surpluses, believing this to be prudent. In fact this is a very dangerous. In modern fiat currency systems the governments are the only source of debt-free money. When they spend they are adding this money into the economy. When they tax they are removing it. They need to spend more than they tax (i.e. run a deficit) in order to add debt-free money into the economy. This additional money is needed to satisfy the private-sector's desire to save. Without it the economy would shrink every year by an amount exactly equal to net private sector savings, as this 'hoarding' of money removes it from circulation, reducing demand. Running a budget surplus reduces private sectors savings. Government ’debt' represents net savings of the private sector. Reducing this debt will reduce their savings. At a time when private sector debt levels are still at very high levels this seems bizarre.
There are compelling historical demonstrations of the dangers of government surpluses. For example, there is the fact that every depression in the USA in the past 230 years, and there have been six of them, was preceded by many years of government budget surpluses. Conversely, on every single occasion that the US federal government has tried to reduce its 'debt' substantially by running multi-year surpluses this has been followed by a financial collapse and a depression. When you appreciate that by running budget surpluses the government is effectively confiscating private sector savings it is not surprising that surpluses are so damaging. Logic and experience are clear. When the government is the supplier the currency deficits are necessary and surpluses are reckless.
Saturday 1 December 2012
Taxes can encourage working
We keep hearing that taxes destroy the motivation to work. I am not aware of any evidence that supports this. In fact countries with high taxes (northern Europe and Japan) have some of the hardest working people, whereas countries with low taxes (eg Monaco and other tax havens) seem to be filled with people who do very little work at all!
In fact there is evidence that taxes have been used effectively to encourage people to work. This was the case when European countries colonised less developed lands and wanted to employ the native people to work on their farms or in their houses, factories and mines. They were understandably reluctant to do these jobs because, being subsistence farmers, they had no need for the wages. This problem was resolved by colonist by imposing a poll tax or hut tax on them, payable in the same currency that was paid to workers. Since payment of these taxes was enforced by threat of punishment it was now necessary to acquire the currency. This motivated them to work for wages. Taxation therefore encouraged working by creating a demand for currency needed to pay the taxes.
The simplest way for a new currency to be introduced and have it accepted is to impose a tax payable in the currency, or allow existing tax obligations to be settled using the new currency. It has been suggested in Greece, for example, that the Greek government start paying wages using government IOU's which would be accepted as payment for taxes. This is an ingenious solution to the key problem facing Greece and other Eurozone countries which is a severe shortage of currency in circulation.
If one considers that taxation is a debt imposed by the government, a good case can be made that the real value of any modern currency ultimately derives from the fact that it can be used to repay debt obligations. These could be debts to private banks or debts to the government (taxes). As long as there are debts payable in a currency, and payment is enforced, there will be demand for that currency.
In fact there is evidence that taxes have been used effectively to encourage people to work. This was the case when European countries colonised less developed lands and wanted to employ the native people to work on their farms or in their houses, factories and mines. They were understandably reluctant to do these jobs because, being subsistence farmers, they had no need for the wages. This problem was resolved by colonist by imposing a poll tax or hut tax on them, payable in the same currency that was paid to workers. Since payment of these taxes was enforced by threat of punishment it was now necessary to acquire the currency. This motivated them to work for wages. Taxation therefore encouraged working by creating a demand for currency needed to pay the taxes.
The simplest way for a new currency to be introduced and have it accepted is to impose a tax payable in the currency, or allow existing tax obligations to be settled using the new currency. It has been suggested in Greece, for example, that the Greek government start paying wages using government IOU's which would be accepted as payment for taxes. This is an ingenious solution to the key problem facing Greece and other Eurozone countries which is a severe shortage of currency in circulation.
If one considers that taxation is a debt imposed by the government, a good case can be made that the real value of any modern currency ultimately derives from the fact that it can be used to repay debt obligations. These could be debts to private banks or debts to the government (taxes). As long as there are debts payable in a currency, and payment is enforced, there will be demand for that currency.
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